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Abstract
Self-control is key to success in life. Initial acts of self-control temporarily impair subsequent self-control performance.
Why such self-control failures occur is unclear, with prominent models postulating a loss of a limited resource vs a loss of
motivation, respectively. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural correlates of
motivation-induced benefits on self-control. Participants initially exerted or did not exert self-control. In a subsequent
Stroop task, participants performed worse after exerting self-control, but not if they were motivated to perform well by
monetary incentives. On the neural level, having exerted self-control resulted in decreased activation in the left inferior
frontal gyrus. Increasing motivation resulted in a particularly strong activation of this area specifically after exerting
self-control. Thus, after self-control exertion participants showed more prefrontal neural activity without improving
performance beyond baseline level. These findings suggest that impaired performance after self-control exertion may
not exclusively be due to a loss of motivation.
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Introduction
Self-control is the ability to control impulses, emotions and
thoughts. It is key to achieving long-term goals such as aca-
demic achievement, stable social relationships and maintaining
good health (Duckworth, 2011; Moffitt et al., 2011). However,
exerting self-control is effortful and costly. The strength model
of self-control (Muraven and Baumeister, 2000; Baumeister,
2014) postulates that self-control relies on a limited and
domain-independent resource that becomes depleted with use.
When self-control resources are reduced, individuals are in a
temporary state of ‘self-control depletion’ that is associated
with an increased risk of self-control failures (see Hagger et al.,
2010, for a meta-analysis; but also Carter et al., 2015; Inzlicht
et al., 2016, for recent discussions).
Several theoretical accounts have challenged the assump-
tion of a limited resource, proposing instead that changes in
motivation are responsible for decreases in self-control over
time (Beedie and Lane, 2012; Kurzban, Duckworth et al., 2013;
Kool and Botvinick, 2014). According to the process model of
self-control (Inzlicht and Schmeichel, 2012; Inzlicht et al., 2014),
initial exertions of self-control shift motivation away from
exerting further control and let individuals strive to pursue in-
herently gratifying and enjoyable behaviors. As a consequence,
attention shifts away from cues signaling the need to control
and toward cues signaling immediate reward.
On the behavioral level, increasing task motivation eliminates
the effects of previous self-control exertion (Muraven and
Slessareva, 2003). How individuals accomplish to counteract de-
pletion effects remains unknown, however. From the perspective
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of the strength model, depletion can only be overcome by add-
itional effort to compensate for the reduction of resources
(Baumeister and Vohs, 2007). In contrast, the process model inter-
prets this finding as evidence that there is no self-control re-
source. Once individuals who have exerted self-control previously
have overcome their drop in motivation, they are equally well pre-
pared to master new self-control tasks as individuals who did not
exert self-control before (Inzlicht and Schmeichel, 2012). These
competing predictions are hard to distinguish with behavioral
data alone—both models predict an elimination of the decline in
performance through increased motivation. Complementary
measurement of brain activity may provide valuable information
on the question of whether a boost in motivation affects depleted
and nondepleted individuals in similar ways.
Few studies have examined the neural correlates of self-
control depletion. An EEG study found a reduced error-related
negativity after self-control exertion, indicating impaired con-
flict detection by the anterior cingulum (Inzlicht and Gutsell,
2007). Two studies using functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) found reduced brain activity in the inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG) after the initial exertion of self-control during cogni-
tive control tasks (Friese et al., 2013; Persson et al., 2013). In add-
ition, after self-control exertion the amygdala and orbitofrontal
cortex showed increased reactivity to emotional and rewarding
stimuli, respectively, while the connectivity with the IFG was
reduced (Wagner et al., 2013; Wagner and Heatherton, 2013).
However, no neuroimaging studies have investigated how indi-
viduals manage to overcome self-control depletion.
In the present study, self-control depletion and task motiv-
ation was manipulated independently. Effects on behavioral
performance in a task requiring self-control (Stroop task) were
observed, and brain activity during task performance was meas-
ured. On the behavioral level, we expected poorer self-control
performance after depletion, but not for participants who were
highly motivated by monetary incentives to perform well
(Muraven and Slessareva, 2003). On the neural level, we
hypothesized that self-control depletion would reduce activity
in lateral prefrontal areas implicated in cognitive control proc-
esses (Friese et al., 2013; Persson et al., 2013) in regularly moti-
vated participants. Regarding neural correlates of increased
task motivation, we tested two competing hypotheses derived
from the process model and the strength model of self-control:
(1) Process model: reduced activity in lateral prefrontal areas re-
flects decreased task motivation. Increasing task motivation
abolishes depletion-dependent differences in brain activity,
leading to similar brain activity in highly motivated, depleted
participants as in nondepleted participants.
(2) Strength model: reduced activity in lateral prefrontal areas
does not only reflect decreased task motivation. Increasing
task motivation results in the recruitment of additional brain
regions and/or a particularly strong activation in certain
brain regions in highly motivated, depleted participants to
compensate for a partial lack of self-control resources.
Methods
Participants
Following the guidelines by Simmons et al. (2011) we aimed at
obtaining at least 20 participants per condition in the final data
set. To account for potential problems with fMRI measurements
and expected data loss due to excessive motion we decided to
recruit 100 participants.
Because of technical problems with fMRI data acquisition,
five participants had to be excluded from the analyses. Three
participants had to be excluded due to excessive movement
during the scanning periods (>3mm in any direction) and two
participants because of claustrophobia in the MRI scanner or
color blindness. Three further participants were detected as
outliers on Stroop interference based on boxplot inspections.
The final sample consisted of 88 participants (41 female) with a
mean age of 23.76 years (s.d. ¼ 3.78). Participants were randomly
assigned to one of four conditions: depletion-high motivation
(n¼ 21), depletion-regular motivation (n¼ 25), control-high mo-
tivation (n¼ 21), and control-regular motivation (n¼ 21). Written
informed consent was obtained from all participants and they
received CHF 25/h (US $25). The ethics committee of the
Canton of Zürich, Switzerland, approved the study.
Procedure
Participants practiced the self-control manipulation task and
the Stroop task outside of the fMRI scanner. Next, they were
positioned in the scanner and their head was secured in the
coil. Participants performed either a thought suppression task
(depletion condition) or an analogous control task not requiring
self-control (control condition) followed by the Stroop task as
the dependent variable. Preceding the Stroop task, the motiv-
ation manipulation was introduced. Half of participants were
told that they could earn up to CHF 10 (US$10) in addition to
their regular payment based on their performance in the Stroop
task (high motivation condition). The other half of participants
did not receive any information linking performance and add-
itional payment (regular motivation condition). An overview of
the study procedure is provided in Figure 1A. After scanning,
participants filled out questionnaires including control ques-
tions, a manipulation check, and demographic data. All partici-
pants received additional payment based on their performance
in the Stroop task, even if this had not been announced before
(regular motivation condition). Participants were then debriefed
and thanked.
Tasks
Thought suppression task. Self-control depletion was manipulated
with a thought suppression task (Wegner, 1989; Mitchell et al.,
2007). The task consisted of three different types of blocks, indi-
cated by traffic lights of different colors. A green traffic light sig-
naled to participants that they were allowed to think freely of
anything in the following block, whereas a red light signaled
that they had to suppress any thoughts about a white bear. Red
and green traffic lights were presented for 2 s and were followed
by a black screen of 40 s duration. During both blocks, partici-
pants were instructed to press a button whenever they thought
of a white bear. If that happened during a red-light block, they
were instructed to redirect their thoughts away and think about
something other than a white bear. The third block type was a
brief reaction time task to keep vigilance high. It consisted of
four to six consecutively presented amber traffic lights and par-
ticipants were instructed to press a button as quickly as possible
each time an amber traffic light appeared. Amber traffic lights
were presented until the button was pressed or until 3 s had
passed, with a black screen presented in between. The depletion
group engaged in 14 red, 7 green and 6 amber light blocks. The
control group engaged in 21 green and 6 amber light blocks.
Blocks in both conditions were presented in a pseudorandom-
ized order. Total task duration was 17min.

















































































Stroop task. Color words appeared in the center of the screen
written in blue, red or yellow letters. Participants were in-
structed to indicate the color of the letters by button press and
ignore the semantic meaning of the word. Each trial was either
congruent or incongruent, such that the semantic meaning of
the word did or did not match the color of the letters, respect-
ively. Stimuli remained on the screen until a button was pressed
or until 1500ms had passed. The duration of a following fixation
cross was adjusted such that each trial was 2200ms long (re-
sponse time after stimulus presentation plus fixation cross).
The task consisted of 246 trials (54 incongruent trials, 192 con-
gruent trials) including 6 practice trials in a pseudorandomized
order for a total of 9min. We have previously used an almost
identical task (Friese et al., 2013).
Functional imaging
MRI scanning was performed on a Philips Intera 3 T wholebody
MR unit equipped with an eight-channel Philips SENSE head
coil at the University Hospital of Zurich, Switzerland. Functional
time series were acquired with a sensitivity encoded, single-
shot echo-planar sequence (SENSE-sshEPI) sensitive to BOLD
contrast (T2* fast field echo with the following acquisition par-
ameters: TR (repetition time)¼ 2500ms, TE (echo time)¼ 35ms,
FOV (field of view)¼ 0.22 cm, acquisition matrix¼ 80  80, inter-
polated to 128  128, voxel size: 2.75  2.75  3.30mm3, no gap
and SENSE acceleration factor R¼ 2.0). By using a midsagittal
scout image, 40 contiguous axial slices were placed to the
anterior–posterior commissure plane covering the entire brain.
The first two acquisitions were discarded to allow for T1 satur-
ation. The Stroop task consisted of approximately 240 func-
tional scans. Participants viewed stimuli through a mirror
mounted on top of the head coil.
Data analysis
Behavioral data were analyzed with SPSS. A subjective demand
score was calculated based on four manipulation-check items
indicating how exhausting the thought suppression task was
and how much they had to control themselves (Cronbach’s
a¼ 0.78). Mood was assessed based on two items prior to and
after scanning (Supplementary Table S1). Stroop interference
scores served as indicators of self-control performance and
were calculated as the difference in the relative frequencies of
errors on incongruent vs congruent trials.
MATLAB Release 2012b and SPM8 were used to analyze
fMRI data. Functional images were corrected for differences
in acquisition time between slices and realigned to correct for
head movement. Next, images were normalized into a
standard stereotaxic space (2  2  2 mm3 voxels) based on
the SPM8 EPI template. Finally, images were spatially
smoothed using an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. A 128-s-
cutoff high-pass filter was added to the confound partition of
the design matrix to account for low-frequency drifts, and a
correction for intrinsic autocorrelations was included in the
analysis.
For every subject, a GLM was set up with four regressors of
interest (correctly answered incongruent trials, correctly an-
swered congruent trials, incorrectly answered trials, button
presses), which were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic
response function, and six movement parameters derived from
realignment correction as regressors of no interest. Contrast
images for each participant comparing correctly answered in-
congruent trials vs congruent trials were used for all analyses.
To identify areas commonly activated during the Stroop task, a
one-sample t-test for the whole sample was calculated. We
then looked for effects of our experimental manipulation in a 2
 2 analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with the factors self-
control depletion and motivation, controlling for Stroop inter-
ference. Stroop interference was chosen as a covariate to re-
ceive a pure measure of self-control performance which is not
confounded by error-related cognitive processes. Correction for
multiple comparisons was employed by family wise error (FWE)
correction for the whole brain based on the random field theory
with a threshold at P< 0.05. To search specifically for reward-
related activity, a region-of-interest (ROI) analysis was con-
ducted in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc). WFU pickatlas was
used to define the area anatomically (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al.,
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Study Procedure and Behavioral Outcomes. (a) Participants performed two tasks. The first task consisted of either a thought suppression task (self-control deple-
tion condition) or an analogous control task not requiring self-control (control condition). All participants performed the same Stroop task as the second task. Before
the Stroop task, half of the participants were motivated to perform well by monetary incentives (high-motivation condition), whereas the other half was not (regular
motivation condition). This resulted in a 2 (self-control: depletion vs. control)  2 (motivation: regular vs high) between-subjects factorial design. (b) Within the regular
motivation condition, the typical effect after self-control exertion occurred such that participants who had exerted self-control in the initial task performed worse in
the subsequent Stroop task. High motivation resulted in a significant reduction in Stroop interference scores for participants in the depletion condition, enabling them
to perform as well as control participants. Within the high motivation condition, self-control depletion had no significant effect on Stroop performance. Higher Stroop
interference scores point to poorer self-control. Error bars indicate6 SEM. *P< 0.05, **P<0.01.

















































































2002; Maldjian et al., 2004). Anatomical labels were assigned




Participants rated the thought suppression task (subjective de-
mand sum score: M¼ 16.55, SEM¼ 0.80) as more demanding
than the control task [11.986 0.56; F(1, 84)¼ 21.20, P< 0.001, par-
tial g2¼ 0.20], suggesting that the self-control manipulation was
successful. As expected, neither the main effect of motivation
nor the interaction between self-control condition and motiv-
ation was significant (Fs< 1, Ps> 0.250).
The self-control manipulation did not affect mood. In a 2  2
 2 ANOVA with the within-subjects factor time (before and
after the experiment) and the between-subjects factors self-
control condition (depletion vs control) and motivation (regular
vs high), no interactions with the experimental conditions were
found (Fs< 1, Ps> 0.250).
Stroop performance
As expected, increasing task motivation eliminated the effect of
self-control depletion on Stroop task performance. The two-way
ANOVA of Stroop interference scores yielded a highly significant
interaction between the self-control and motivation conditions
[F(1, 84)¼ 7.49, P¼ 0.008, partial g2¼ 0.08], depicted in Figure 1B.
Follow-up analyses confirmed our hypotheses. In the regular mo-
tivation condition, depleted participants (M¼ 10.14, SEM¼ 1.60)
performed worse than control participants [5.8861.18;
t(84)¼ 2.52, P¼ 0.014, d¼ 0.62]. However, highly motivated,
depleted participants performed as well as regularly motivated
control participants [5.1260.76; t(84)¼ 1.05, P> 0.250], and signifi-
cantly improved when compared with depleted participants with
no motivational boost [t(84)¼2.97, P¼ 0.004, d¼ 0.81]. Finally,
highly motivated control participants (7.5460.95) did not differ
from regularly motivated control participants [(t(84)¼0.94,
P> 0.250] nor from highly motivated depleted participants
[t(84)¼1.38, P¼ 0.173]. These analyses indicate that initial self-
control efforts led to a decrement in subsequent self-control per-
formance in the regular motivation condition, whereas increased
task motivation eliminated this effect. See the Supplementary
Results for analyses of Stroop reaction time.
Neural activity associated with self-control
Preliminary analyses. Stroop task processing increased activity in
widespread prefrontal areas including the dorsolateral pre-
frontal, parietal and the cingulate cortices (Supplementary
Table S2). This pattern is in line with previous studies on inhib-
ition tasks and specifically the Stroop task (Derrfuss et al., 2005;
Nee et al., 2007). Furthermore, activity in frontal, parietal and oc-
cipital areas and the cerebellum were increased in the high
when compared with the low-motivation condition
(Supplementary Table S3). These are areas that are commonly
active during Stroop task performance (Nee et al., 2007), thus
providing evidence that the promise of reward for good
performance enhanced task-relevant processing in the high
motivation condition.
Main analyses. We tested the competing hypotheses concern-
ing the effects of self-control depletion and task motivation on
neural activity. If performance deficits after exerting self-
control are purely due to diminished motivation to exert further
self-control, elimination of these deficits by increased task mo-
tivation should be accompanied by a similar elimination of
depletion-induced reductions in lateral prefrontal brain activity
(Hypothesis 1). In contrast, if performance deficits after exerting
self-control cannot be reduced to a lack of motivation, increased
task motivation may affect depleted and control participants in
different ways on the level of brain activity (Hypothesis 2).
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, increased task motivation after
self-control depletion resulted in a strong and highly significant
increase in prefrontal activation. A 2  2 ANCOVA was calcu-
lated with the factors self-control condition and motivation,
controlling for differences in behavioral performance between
conditions. Family-wise error (FWE) correction was applied to
the whole brain, which is a conservative method to control for
multiple testing based on the random field theory. This analysis
yielded a statistically robust interaction effect in the left IFG
(pars triangularis) between self-control condition and motiv-
ation (BA 45, Figure 2A, Peak at [36 38 12], Z¼ 4.90, P(FWE-cor-
rected for the whole brain)¼ 0.026, Cohen’s d¼ 1.16). The left
IFG is part of a large prefrontal cluster activated during the
Stroop task (Supplementary Table S2), both in the complete
sample as well as when analyzing the regular motivation condi-
tions only. Thus, the brain area of the left IFG is (i) critically
involved in processing of the Stroop task in general and (ii) sen-
sitive to interacting effects of depletion and motivation. To
examine activity in the left IFG further, the first eigenvariate
from the activity cluster of the interaction effect was extracted
(uncorrected threshold of P< 0.001, 108 voxels) and follow-up
analyses were conducted (Figure 2B). In the regular motivation
condition, the interaction cluster in the left IFG was signifi-
cantly weaker activated in depleted participants (0.416 0.12)
than in control participants (0.7960.12; P¼ 0.031). In contrast,
depleted participants in the high motivation condition (1.2460.
13) compensated this depletion-induced decrease and instead
showed significantly higher activity when compared with regu-
larly motivated control participants (P¼ 0.011), regularly moti-
vated depleted participants (P< 0.001), and highly motivated
control participants (0.4860.12; P< 0.001). Finally in the control
condition, there was an opposite trend toward stronger activity
in the left IFG interaction cluster in regularly when compared
with highly motivated participants (P¼ 0.079).
To search for interaction effects not withstanding whole-
brain correction, we used a more lenient threshold and identi-
fied further interaction effects in the precentral gyrus and the
Thalamus (Supplementary Table S4). In accordance with our
prior study (Friese et al., 2013), we also found an interaction in
the right lateral prefrontal cortex, but with weaker effects (see
the Supplementary Results for further details). These inter-
actions revealed similar activation patterns as the one identi-
fied in the left IFG. Meta-analytic results show that these areas
are typically activated during the Stroop task (Nee et al., 2007).
Furthermore, when the analysis was performed without con-
trolling for task performance, the cluster in the IFG was also the
area with the strongest interaction effect ([38 38 12], Z¼ 4.44,
P[uncorrected]< .001), but the effect did not withstand the con-
servative FWE correction for the whole brain (see
Supplementary Table S5 and the Supplementary Figure S1 for
the full results of the 2  2 ANOVA with the factors self-control
condition and motivation).
Reward-related neural activity
The previous analyses revealed stronger brain activity in the
left IFG after self-control exertion in participants in the high

















































































motivation condition than in any other condition, which is in
line with the strength model of self-control, but difficult to rec-
oncile with the process model. One way for the process model
to explain this finding is by referring to its assumption that par-
ticipants become particularly sensitive to signals of reward after
exerting self-control (Inzlicht and Schmeichel, 2012). In the pre-
sent study, higher reward-sensitivity could enhance the motiv-
ation to perform well to increase chances of obtaining the
reward. From this perspective, differences in left IFG activity
would reflect motivational differences in the Stroop task—
reduced after exerting self-control in the regular motivation
condition, but particularly high due to increased reward
sensitivity after exerting self-control in the high-motivation
condition. In contrast, if there were no differences in reward-
sensitivity as a function of self-control condition, this would be
incompatible with the view that left IFG activity reflected the
motivation to perform well. To test this second set of competing
predictions, an anatomically defined ROI analysis in the NAcc
was conducted. The NAcc is one of the brain areas most consist-
ently associated with reward-related processing (Cauda et al.,
2011; Liu et al., 2011).
Analysis of NAcc activity during the Stroop task revealed a
significant main effect of the motivation condition (Figure 3A).
Highly motivated participants showed stronger activity in the
NAcc bilaterally (Figure 3B) than regularly motivated partici-
pants who were unaware of a monetary reward for good per-
formance (left NAcc: Peak at [8 0 6], Z¼ 3.94, P¼ 0.008,
Cohen’s d¼ 0.90; right NAcc: Peak at [4 10 8], Z¼ 3.88, P¼ 0.010,
Cohen’s d¼ 0.90; small volume corrected (SVC) with FWE for a
bilateral NAcc ROI). This main effect suggests that NAcc activity
during task performance may serve as an indicator of reward-
related processes in the present study. Importantly, there was
no interaction effect of the motivation condition and the self-
control condition, and no main effect of the self-control condi-
tion [both ps(SVC)> 0.250]. Follow-up analyses were conducted
based on the extracted activity of the two NAcc. Separate tests
for the two motivation conditions revealed neither a significant
difference in the high motivation (depletion: 0.406 0.12; control:
0.3360.11; t(84)¼ 0.46, P¼ 0.650) nor in the regular motivation
condition (depletion: 0.1560.10; control: 0.1560.14;
t(84)<0.01, P¼ 0.996). Thus, there was no evidence for
increased reward sensitivity on the neural level after exerting
self-control. In addition to the NAcc analysis, a bilateral ROI of
the dorsal part of the striatum was analyzed. Highly motivated
participants showed marginally stronger activity in this area
when compared with regularly motivated participants ([6 8
10], Z¼ 3.70, P(FWE)¼ 0.072), but there were again no inter-
action effects or effects of self-control condition [both
ps(SVC)> 0.250].
NAcc activity was included as a covariate in the main ana-
lysis of brain activity in the cluster in the left IFG. The inter-
action of self-control condition and motivation condition in the
left IFG remained significant (Peak again at [36 38 12], Z¼ 5.00,
P(FWE-corrected for the whole brain)¼ 0.019). Finally, we exam-
ined if NAcc activity may account for depletion effects on the
behavioral level by including NAcc activity as a covariate in the
analysis of Stroop interference scores. The covariate was insig-
nificant (F(1, 83)¼ 2.52, P¼ .116) and the interaction effect of
self-control condition and motivation remained highly signifi-
cant (F(1, 83)¼ 7.93, P¼ .006). Thus, increased reward sensitivity
as indicated by NAcc activity cannot account for the present
findings on the behavioral or the neural level. In concert, the
findings suggest that left IFG activity does not reflect motivation
to perform well in the Stroop task.
To investigate effects of the experimental manipulations on
functional brain connections, a psychophysiological-interaction
(PPI) analysis was conducted with the NAcc and the cluster
within the left IFG identified in the above analysis as seed areas.
No changes in connection strength were found as a function of
the experimental conditions when whole-brain correction was
employed (see the Supplementary Results for additional ana-
lyses with a more lenient threshold).
Discussion
There is an ongoing debate whether the mechanisms underly-
ing self-control depletion effects are caused by depletion of a
(physical) self-control resource (Baumeister, 2014) or whether
they can be exclusively explained by changes in motivation
(Beedie and Lane, 2012; Kurzban et al., 2013; Inzlicht et al., 2014;
Kool and Botvinick, 2014). In the present study, exerting self-
control in a thought suppression task led to impaired subse-
quent Stroop task performance and decreased activity in the
left IFG. On the behavioral level, this self-control depletion ef-
fect was eliminated by monetary incentives to perform well in
the Stroop task. On the neural level, there was no similar elim-
ination of the aftereffects of exerting self-control. Instead,
highly motivated depleted participants activated the left IFG
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Prefrontal activity interacts with self-control exertion and motivation. (a) Based on the contrast “correct incongruent vs correct congruent trials” during perform-
ance of the Stroop task, an interaction cluster was found of which 80% lay within the IFG, and 20% within the middle frontal cortex [P(uncorrected)<0.001]. Brain activ-
ity in this area is commonly associated with inhibition of dominant response tendencies (Derrfuss et al., 2005; Nee et al., 2007). Activation is superimposed on a
canonical normalized image. (b) Activity in this cluster (arbitrary units), corrected for the covariate Stroop performance. Within the regular motivation condition, a de-
pletion-related reduction of activity can be observed. After having exerted self-control, highly motivated depleted participants activate the area more strongly than
participants in the other conditions. Error bars indicate6SEM; *P< 0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.

















































































more strongly than any other group. These findings on afteref-
fects of exerting self-control on the neural level (i) are difficult
to explain by task disengagement and a lack of motivation
alone, and (ii) are compatible with a resource account of
self-control (without providing direct support for a resource
account).
Resource vsmotivation
From the perspective of the strength model of self-control, the
drop in activity after exerting self-control in the regular motiv-
ation condition reflects increased difficulty to recruit areas
needed for control due to a partial depletion of resources
(Persson et al., 2013). The strong IFG activity after exerting self-
control in the high-motivation condition may suggest that
depleted participants needed to recruit the IFG to a stronger de-
gree to compensate for the partial loss of resources. This finding
may indicate that these participants invested increased effort
or that they changed their task strategy, which might have led
to a shift in neural resources from other areas to the IFG.
Further studies are needed to understand this mechanism bet-
ter. The crucial point is that the motivation manipulation af-
fected depleted and nondepleted participants differently.
Compensating effects associated with increased frontal
brain activity have also been observed in the aging brain
(Cabeza et al., 2002; Cox et al., 2014). In those studies elderly par-
ticipants were able to maintain stable performance to a certain
degree, but a sudden drop in performance followed when the
compensation threshold was reached (Prvulovic et al., 2005).
Likewise, in a series of behavioral experiments motivation
counteracted intermediate levels, but not more severe levels of
depletion (Vohs et al., 2013).
From the perspective of the process model, the evident as-
sumption is that the drop in IFG activity in the regular motiv-
ation condition reflects a loss of task motivation. Increasing
motivation should bring depleted and control participants on
the same level and eliminate any behavioral and neural differ-
ences between these groups. This is also what other motiv-
ational accounts would predict, such as the labor/leisure
tradeoff model of cognitive control (Kool and Botvinick, 2014) or
the opportunity cost model of subjective effort and task per-
formance (Kurzban et al., 2013). However, the motivation ma-
nipulation affected the depletion and the control group very
differently; the depleted group showed much higher left IFG ac-
tivity when highly motivated. This finding is difficult to recon-
cile with models that focus purely on a loss of motivation after
depletion, because the incentive to perform well presumably
has re-established motivation. Possibly, depletion reduced self-
efficacy for the Stroop task and participants felt that they
needed to exert additional effort to perform well when they
were incentivized to do so (Chow et al., 2015).
Alternatively, to reconcile the present findings with a motiv-
ational account such as the process model one could argue that
the IFG is evaluating different goals, i.e. to disengage from the
task or to gain the dangling reward. However, the current study
and meta-analyses have identified the IFG as an area that is
generally activated during Stroop task performance, independ-
ent of task motivation (Derrfuss et al., 2005; Nee et al., 2007).
There are few studies which have reported both activation asso-
ciated with inhibitory and reward processing in different parts
of the IFG (Mullette-Gillman et al., 2011; Yamasaki et al., 2002). A
comparison of peak coordinates revealed that the IFG activity in
the present study lies closer to clusters associated with inhib-
ition than with reward processing. Further studies point to the
area’s role in inhibition of dominant responses and self-control
in various domains (Aron et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2009; Kober
et al., 2010; Berkman et al., 2011; Volkow and Baler, 2012;
Tabibnia et al., 2014). Hence, the IFG is overwhelmingly impli-
cated in inhibitory processes, not in processes reflecting task
motivation. Furthermore, the present findings fit well with pre-
vious work on the aftereffects of self-control exertion. Persson
et al. (2013) also observed reduced brain activity in the left IFG
after exerting self-control. In an earlier study, we reported that
self-control exertion reduced activity in the right inferior and
middle frontal gyrus (Friese et al., 2013). Research has high-
lighted the importance of the right IFG (Aron et al., 2004) as well
as the left IFG (Swick et al., 2014) for inhibition. While the IFG
was activated bilaterally in the current task (Supplementary
Table S2), the interaction effect was restricted to the IFG in the
left hemisphere. It has been suggested that the left hemisphere
is particularly important for the Stroop task because of the
strong verbal nature of the task (Nee et al., 2007).
In addition to decreased task motivation, the process model
assumes that self-control exertion renders participants more
sensitive to signals of rewards and leads to changes in attention.
Note that these potential consequences of depletion are likely
contingent on changes in motivation. Changes in reward pro-
cessing and attention seem unlikely and even disadvantageous
for goal-attainment if motivation to perform well in a control
task was still high. We will discuss the current findings with re-
spect to these potential downstream consequences of depletion.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. The nucleus accumbens showed an increased activity bilaterally in highly motivated participants when compared with regularly motivated participants for the
contrast “correct incongruent vs correct congruent trials” during performance of the Stroop task (a). For illustration purposes a threshold at P<0.005 was chosen and
activation is superimposed on a canonical normalized image. (b) The motivation condition had a significant influence on activity in the nucleus accumbens, but there
was no effect of the self-control condition or interaction between the two factors. Error bars indicate6SEM. *P< 0.05.

















































































(a) Changes in reward processing. Is it possible that self-control
exertion made participants more susceptible to monetary re-
wards and that they therefore activated the left IFG particularly
strongly when motivated? Based on the NAcc findings, this pos-
sibility appears unlikely. The NAcc has been related to individ-
uals’ motivation to earn a potential reward (Clithero et al., 2011).
NAcc activity is usually measured during a trial anticipation
phase, after participants were informed about the potential re-
ward, and the reward value is varied across trials (e.g. Knutson
et al., 2001). In the current study, in line with the original behav-
ioral studies manipulating motivation and self-control exertion
(Muraven and Slessareva, 2003), participants were informed
about the potential reward at the beginning of the task. NAcc
activity was recorded during ongoing Stroop task performance.
Nevertheless, motivating participants with monetary incentives
increased activity in the NAcc when mastering difficult incon-
gruent when compared with congruent trials during the Stroop
task. This suggests that the NAcc activity observed here reflects
reward-related processes despite the procedural differences to
typical studies focusing on NAcc activity. In other words, the
observed main effect of the motivation manipulation on NAcc
activity during Stroop task performance provides an internal
validation of NAcc activity as reward-related processing. It rules
out that the task-concomitant measurement rendered only un-
interpretable noise in NAcc activity. Crucially, NAcc activity
should have been particularly high in highly motivated depleted
participants if they were particularly motivated to attain the re-
ward. However, NAcc activity was similar in highly motivated
depleted and control participants. Thus, the present findings
suggest that depleted participants were not more strongly moti-
vated to attain the potential reward for good performance than
control participants.
(b) Changes in attention. The process model postulates shifts in
attention toward immediately gratifying cues and away from
cues signaling the need to control after self-control exertion.
Could activity in the left IFG reflect such attentional processes?
If IFG activity reflected attention toward immediately gratifying
cues, this activity should have increased, not decreased, after
self-control exertion in the regular motivation condition. It
should have decreased, not increased, after self-control exertion
in the high motivation condition, because these participants
were interested in performing well, for which relegating atten-
tion to rewards would have been disadvantageous. Turning to
attention to cues signaling the need to control, the process
model predicts that increasing motivation reestablishes these
processes after self-control exertion. The model does not pre-
dict that incentivized participants show particularly strong
task-relevant attention after self-control exertion. Thus, even if
the left IFG activity reflected attention processes, the current re-
sult pattern does not seem to fit the predictions of the process
model.
Critique of the strength model
Even though the present findings are compatible with the
strength model, it is important to realize two observations: first,
compatibility with the strength model does not imply no other
approach could also be compatible with the data pattern. We
only focused on predictions of the strength model vs the pro-
cess model here. Second, direct evidence for the strength mod-
el’s main assumption, the existence of a limited resource
needed for self-control, is still missing. Previous research at-
tempted to show that the self-control resource is blood glucose
(Gailliot and Baumeister, 2007; Gailliot et al., 2007), but these ef-
forts have been heavily disputed (Beedie and Lane, 2012;
Molden et al., 2012; Sanders et al., 2012; Kurzban et al., 2013).
Although more than 150 studies have delivered results compat-
ible with the strength model, all evidence remains indirect until
concrete testable hypotheses about the nature of the resource
have been proposed. Neither behavioral nor fMRI studies are
capable of directly measuring a resource and can therefore pro-
vide only indirect evidence for the model. This is different for
the process model. Assumptions of reduced motivation, or
increased reward sensitivity after self-control exertion can be
directly tested. Measuring neurometabolites with positron
emission tomography (PET) or magnetic resonance spectros-
copy might reveal insights into the physical basis of the poten-
tial self-control resource.
Recently, the strength model of self-control has received a
fair amount of criticism. A high-powered registered replication
report (RRR) (Hagger et al., 2016) had 23 laboratories in different
countries ran one particular computerized version of an ego-
depletion study and found a null effect overall (see Baumeister
and Vohs, 2016, for a commentary). This RRR raises fundamen-
tal questions about the depletion effect and the strength model
of self-control. However, a RRR of one specific depletion ma-
nipulation with one specific dependent variable primarily
allows conclusions about this particular experimental setup
and is less suited to draw inferences about the general (non)ex-
istence of depletion effects. Meta-analyses summarizing the
evidence of a broad array of experimental setups are more
suited for this aim. A first meta-analysis revealed a mean effect
size of d¼ 0.62 (Hagger et al., 2010), but a more recent meta-
analysis found evidence for publication bias in the literature
and reported effect sizes that were smaller or not distinguish-
able from zero (g¼ 0.43 for random effects model, g¼ 0.24 for
trim-and-fill correction, b¼ 0.00 for PEESE or b¼0.27 for PET;
Carter et al., 2015). In turn, the techniques used by Carter et al.
(2015) to estimate and correct for publication bias have been
heavily criticized (Gervais, 2015; Inzlicht et al., 2016). Thus, the
magnitude of the depletion effect is currently unknown. More,
preferably high-powered, pre-registered research on the topic is
needed, including moderator studies that may help to gain a
more differentiated understanding about the boundary condi-
tions of the depletion effect.
In the present study, we relied on both a widely used deple-
tion manipulation (thought suppression) and a widely used de-
pendent variable (Stroop task). This combination led to a
depletion effect in the regular motivation condition of d¼ 0.62.
Previous research provided evidence for increased task motiv-
ation to counteract the depletion effect, similar to the present
study (Muraven and Slessareva, 2003), and we have conceptu-
ally replicated this behavioral effect in our own laboratory.
Thus, we are optimistic that the present findings rest on a ro-
bust empirical foundation, and we deem it important for future
research to provide further evidence on this.
Conclusion
The present study suggests that decrements in self-control per-
formance cannot be attributed to diminished motivation alone.
While motivational processes play an important role in self-
control depletion effects, they appear to interact with
depletion-specific processes on the neural level. The nature of
the depletion-specific processes currently remains unidentified,
but evidence suggests that they may be related to use-
dependent processes of specific prefrontal brain areas involved

















































































in self-control. Models of self-control should incorporate the
idea that additional factors besides a loss of motivation are
needed to explain self-control depletion effects.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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